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The Europeanisation of Maltese interest 
groups: a comparative study after the 
first decade of EU membership 
by Mario Thomas Vassallo 
Introduction 
This paper presents the findings of a study on the Europeanisation of interest groups in Malta during 
its first ten years of EU membership. The nature of this empirical study is primarily comparative, 
covering the Republic of Ireland (hereafter referred to as Ireland) as well. Ireland is another small 
island member state on the periphery of an integrated continent and which bears some cultural 
similarities and historical experiences with Malta. Although Ireland may exhibit absolute dimensions 
of bigger proportions when compared to micro Malta, if the notion of relative power1 is applied in 
conjunction with historical pathways and geographical approximation to neighbour countries, Ireland 
is definitely small compared to Great Britain. Hence the selection of Malta and Ireland as two small 
island member states of the EU avoids any controversy of a definitional nature. 
In particular this study sets to explore how the embedded geopolitical characteristics originating 
from small-sized member states affect the resistance to (or incorporation of) the external incentives 
and norms of EU governance. Research primacy rests on the role and character of interest groups 
involved in national and sub-national policy-making and their interplay with governmental actors, as 
well as their participation in EU affairs. The study has two principal aims: 
1. Assessing whether Maltese and Irish interest groups have experienced a marginal or 
significant degree of Europeanisation within their organisational set-ups, working 
practices and values, and 
                                                          
1
 The relative, or qualitative, approach considers power to be more fungible. Size still plays a role in defining a 
small state, but in this approach it is merely a variable, and furthermore is relative (Nugent 2003). Jonathan 
Swift’s reflection, quoted from his epic novel Gulliver’s Travels (1726), that ‘[u]ndoubtedly philosophers are in 
the right when they tell us that nothing is great or little otherwise than by comparison’ really hits the nail on its 
head. The relative approach evaluates the state’s relationship to its wider-environment with possible 
considerations, including the amount of influence a state exercises and the extent to which it perceives itself, 
and is perceived by others, as being small. 
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2. Identifying whether the resulting Europeanisation is a consequence of vertical or 
horizontal enablers of change. 
The investigation starts by introducing interest groups and the greater role that they are 
incrementally acquiring in the public sphere. This is followed by a brief analysis of Europeanisation, 
emphasising its potential to affect changes in domestic interest groups through its vertical and 
horizontal stimuli for change. Prior to the presentation of the empirical findings, a detailed 
explanation of the research methodology employed is provided. The conclusion summarises the 
quantitative and qualitative findings and provides an answer to the two principal aims. 
Research context 
Simply defined, interest groups comprise a wide and diversified range of rational entities, united by a 
common belief system, that have sufficient identity to act on behalf of their members and which, 
therefore, have some influence either on public opinion or on government to attain their prescribed 
goals.2They include a pluralist range of non-governmental entities operating across different sectoral 
areas at the local, national and supranational levels of power. Lately, the meaning of the term 
interest groups has been widened to include universities, local government committees, state-
sponsored bodies, public/private partnerships, the media, as well as foreign and pan-continental 
interest groups that are all exerting a direct or indirect impact on domestic institutions and processes 
that enact public policy.3  
As interest groups provide a link between state actors and the rest of society,4 their meaningful input 
into the decision-making process is seen as a sign of a functioning democracy,5 particularly in our 
times which are characterised by erosional symptoms of public trust in traditional politics, made 
evident by popular uprisings, low electoral turnouts, declining party memberships and dwindling 
interest in traditional political affairs. Like other European politicians, Maltese and Irish political elites 
are aware of the escalating importance of interest groups in managing public affairs within an EU 
context. Edward Warrington claims that civil society in Malta offers one of the most interesting and 
diverse forms of citizens’ engagement, deeply rooted in Catholicism and in representative 
democracy;6 yet Alfred Sant laments that it ‘is still considered as a vague field of analysis, lacking 
                                                          
2
 R. Scruton (2007), Dictionary of Political Thought, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. 
3
 A.J. Cigler and B.A. Loomis, B.A. (1995), Interest Group Politics, USA: CQ Press. 
4
 I. Bache and S. George (2006), Politics in the European Union, UK: Oxford University Press. 
5
 K. Karr (2006), Democracy and Lobbying in the European Union, Chicago: University of Chicago. 
6
 E. Warrington (2010), The Department of Public Policy, Malta: University of Malta, p. 5. 
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adequate national awareness and consistent momentum of leadership’.7 In Ireland, civic activism 
takes place via a wide range of organisations,8 practically covering all areas of social, cultural and 
economic life.  However, there is limited information in the literature with regards to the impact of 
EU policies and its governance style on Irish interest groups.9 
The next section reviews the different dimensions of Europeanisation and proposes a definition that 
is specifically related to its transformative potential impact on domestic interest groups. 
Understanding the dimensions of Europeanisation  
The most common trends in the literature of Europeanisation focus on the impact of European 
unification on domestic political and cultural processes of the member states and beyond.10 
Notwithstanding the emphasis on ‘bottom-up’ initiatives on policy processes, the conceptual scope 
of Europeanisation started to incorporate ‘top-down’ and ‘horizontal’ initiatives in favour of the 
European regional integration, together with an accentuation on national and sub-national structures 
and actors.11  Europeanisation, in its contemporary meaning, involves a 360 degree approach to 
interpret the institutionalisation of EU polity, politics and policies across supranational, national and 
sub-national arenas. This implies the co-existence of ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ mechanisms of 
Europeanisation that render the EU as a political system with interconnected institutions, operating 
at multiple levels and having unique policy features.12  
The ‘vertical’ dimension of Europeanisation refers to hierarchical linkages and negotiations between 
higher and lower levels of governance, including their institutional, financial, and legislative aspects. 
Here, local capacity building and incentives for effectiveness of sub-national levels of government 
and civil society are crucial issues for improving the quality and coherence of public policy. 
The ‘horizontal’ dimension refers to cooperative arrangements between regions or between state 
and non-state organisations. These partnership agreements are increasingly common as a means by 
                                                          
7
 A. Sant (2009), ‘Reliġjon Organizzata u Awtorità Ċivili’, in Farrugia, M., Hide and Seek: reflections on faith and 
culture, Malta: KSU, p. 128. 
8
 M. Adshead and J. Tonge (2009), Politics in Ireland: convergence and divergence, Ireland: Palgrave Macmillan. 
9
 Study on Volunteering on the EU: Country Report Ireland (2010), at http://youth-partnership-
eu.coe.int/youth-partnership/documents/EKCYP/Youth_Policy/docs/Voluntary/Policy/National_report_IE.pdf 
10
 T. Börzel T. and Risse (2003), ‘Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe’, in K. Featherstone and C.M. 
Radaelli (eds.) The Politics of Europeanization, Oxford: Oxford Press, p. 57.     
11
 M.P. Vink and P. Graziano (eds.) (2008) Europeanization: New Research Agendas, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
12
 I. Bache and M. Flinders (2004), Multi-level Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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which to improve the effectiveness of public service delivery and implementation of development 
strategies through socialisation and collective learning.13  
In this context, Europeanisation is defined as ‘the reorientation or reshaping of politics’ in the 
national and subnational arena in ways that reflect policies, practices or preference advanced 
through the EU system of governance. 14 In line with its specific aims, this study opts for a more 
stringent definition: 
Europeanisation refers to the effects of vertical and horizontal enablers of change on the 
domestic patterns of interest representation and routes of influence as a corollary of EU 
membership. 
Assessing Europeanisation effects on interest groups 
The principal effects of Europeanisation on interest groups include how accession may have 
increased the resource base of domestic groups and changed their internal organisational structures, 
enhanced their participation in domestic affairs, created new institutional channels for lobbying and 
diversified their normative formation to start embracing a more European identity. Rinus Van 
Schendelen maintains that ‘managing the EU arena’ and ‘handling the home front’ are not contrary 
forces but constitute a single continuum.15 The empirical results being presented in this study relate 
specifically to four different, yet inter-related variables concerning (i) attitude, (ii) responsiveness, (iii) 
involvement and (iv) normativeness of interest groups vis-à-vis the EU. The next sections map out the 
various factors that have been incorporated in designing an appropriate research methodology to 
investigate how Maltese and Irish interest groups respond to the mentioned variables. 
Spatial and temporal dimensions 
This study is approached from the perspective and empirical experience of two small island member 
states, namely Malta and Ireland. They share a common set of features in their geopolitical and 
geocultural profiles, although nonetheless significant diverging attributes cannot be ignored. Their 
common British legacy after centuries of colonisation nurtured similar political ideologies and 
practice at home. Their political systems are based on the English Westminster model, though less so 
today than in the past. From an economic perspective, the Maltese and Irish economies have 
undergone great transformations in the past three decades and, prior to the recent collapse of the 
                                                          
13
 S. Bulmer and C. Radaelli (2004), ‘The Europeanisation of National Policy’ in S. Bulmer and C. Lequesne (eds.), 
Member States and the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
14
 I. Bache and A. Jordan (2006), The Europeanization of British Politics, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
15
 R. Van Schendelen (2005), Macchiavelli in Brussels: The Art of Lobbying the EU, Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press. 
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Irish economy, they were favourably appraised by the international community for their knowledge-
open-economies focusing on services and high-tech industries. Culturally, the two states have 
traditionally shared a Roman Catholic outlook towards life, although their conservative societal fabric 
started to change since the 1960s due to strong processes of secularisation and consumerism. 
Besides the implications of smallness, Malta and Ireland have also to be comprehensively studied as 
peripheral island states on the borders of a massive integrated continent. ‘Islandness’ lends itself to 
metaphorical definition transcending the strictly geographical requirement of water boundaries.  
Anthropology and sociology draw attention to ‘islandness’ that is also a state of mind, or a 
human condition of relative isolation and distinctiveness, expressed across almost the 
entire range of human experience, from economic activity to speech patterns, from belief 
systems to genetics’.16  
In this context, this paper is interested in how the elements of size and geography shape the ecology 
of the polity’s landscape and the ethos of interdependencies among governmental and non-
governmental actors.  Godfrey Baldacchino argues that ‘any island, any islander’, is a living 
contradiction between ‘openness and closure’, gripped by negotiating the anxious balance between 
‘roots and routes’ and, thus, is not surprisingly nervous of ‘bridges and tunnels’ that presage 
attachment to main-lands. 17  In this vein of paradoxical features, a study on the effects of 
Europeanisation of interest groups originating from small island member states provides a 
fascinating and insightful narrative on the dichotomic tension between conservatism and modernity, 
stability and change, tradition and innovation, seclusion and exposure.  
Given that Ireland joined the EU 31 years before Malta, the temporal dimension of the research 
design covers the period between 2004 and 2012, that is, from the year of Malta’s accession to the 
year when the data collection phase of this study was completed.  
Selected case scenarios 
In methodological terms, this study subscribes to a comparative case-study oriented approach 
focused mainly on two broad types of interest groups, namely Social and Human Rights Groups and 
Environmental Groups. In contrast with trade unions and employers’ associations, the selected 
groups are considered to have less political clout in influencing public affairs. Environmental groups 
(comprising both permanent promotional movements and single issue pressure groups) and social 
and human rights organisations (embracing a wide range of interests including community resource 
                                                          
16
 Warrington and Milne (2007), p. 380. 
17
 G.  Baldacchino (2007), A World of Islands, Canada: University of Prince Edward Island, p. 5. 
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centres, LGBT movements, ethnic minorities, migrant communities, victim support, disabled people, 
etc.) are tagged as outsiders on the national scale, mainly because many of them are associated with  
reformists and radical minority leaders who may be ideologically opposed to institutionalised 
political systems.  
Mixed methodology  
Since Europeanisation is a complex area for analysis, this study adopts a mixed methods’ research 
design. Whilst quantitative data gives an aggregate overview of the phenomena under scrutiny, the 
use of qualitative research is necessitated by the persistent requirement to understand complex 
behaviours, needs, systems and cultures.  
The quantitative contribution is provided through the administration of self-completion 
questionnaires. In the Maltese case, all registered groups under the two selected categories have 
been included in the exercise, thus no sampling technique was applied.18 The Irish case required a 
slightly different strategy. Irish environmental groups that function on a national level have all been 
included while random sampling was applied for social and human rights groups. The register of The 
Wheel19 was used to construct the sample. Considering the limited resources available in terms of 
time, finance and people, 18% of the 800 organisations that are registered within The Wheel have 
been randomly selected, thus, obtaining a sample of 144 entities which more or less resembles the 
number of social groups in Malta. Table 1 shows the classification of population/sample sizes and 
response rates in both countries. 
Table 1: Sample size and response rate 
Sector Country Population / 
Sample Size 
Questionnaires 
received 
Response rate 
Social and 
Human rights 
Groups 
Malta 
Ireland 
130+ 
144* 
96 
64 
73.8% 
44.4% 
Environmental 
Groups 
Malta 
Ireland 
26+ 
47+ 
20 
20 
76.9% 
42.5% 
+ 
Whole population; 
*
Sample 
The second data collection instrument consisted of semi-structured interviews. Besides interviewing 
high representatives of the two selected types of interest groups, other protagonists were included, 
                                                          
18
 The list of all registered social and Human rights groups and environmental organisations was provided by 
the Office of the Commissioner of Voluntary Organisations (CVO).  
19
 The Wheel is a support and representative body connecting community and voluntary organisations and 
charities across Ireland.  
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including formal mediating bodies comprising state and non-state actors, politicians, scholars and 
think tanks, thus permitting a more holistic approach to investigate any signs of Europeanisation 
within interest groups. A total of 31 interviews were conducted, 15 in Malta and 16 in Ireland. Each 
organisation/person interviewed was given a code in order to secure anonymity. The coding process 
works as follows: the first letter corresponds to the country of origin (Malta or Ireland), the next set 
of letters defines the nature of the organisation (Social/Human rights or Environmental) whilst the 
number at the end represents the interview number, e.g. MSHG11 refers to a Maltese Social and 
Human rights Group (interview 11) and IEG21 refers to an Irish Environmental Group (interview 21). 
Findings and analysis 
This section presents the main findings of the study retrieved through the combination of qualitative 
and quantitative analysis. In particular, results shed light on six key dimensions, namely attitudes 
towards the EU, participation in EU related activities, European funding, opportunities of 
socialisation, lobbying preferences and normative transformations. The selection of this specific set 
of dimensions is supported by literature and theories that are employed in the analysis of the EU’s 
effects on domestic civil society. Due to word limit constraints, I will not discuss the theoretical 
background behind the six dimensions that designate the empirical part of this paper but I will cover 
this in my forthcoming publication.20 
Attitude towards the EU 
Public attitudes towards the EU are a highly complex issue, consisting of many individual parts that 
are closely interlinked with one another. Lauren McLaren claims that ‘antipathy toward other 
cultures’ is a crucial element when formulating public perception,21 while Thomas Christin maintains 
that individual attitudes towards domestic economic and political reforms are good predictors of 
citizens’ attitudes towards the EU.22 Most researchers also seem to agree on the importance of 
‘cognitive mobilization’, meaning that a higher level of information about the EU leads to a higher 
level of public support.23 Findings from this research confirm that interest groups’ attitude towards 
the EU is affected by a combination of these factors.  
                                                          
20
 M.T. Vassallo (forthcoming), The Europeanization of Interest Groups in Malta and Ireland: a small state 
perspective, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. 
21
 L.M. McLaren (2002) ‘Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived Cultural 
Threat?’, The Journal of Politics, 64(2), 551-566. 
22
 T. Christin (2005), ‘Economic and Political Basis of Attitudes Towards the EU in Central and East European 
Countries in the 1990s’, European Union Politics, 6, 29-57. 
23
 A. Pölzlbauer (2011), ‘Public Attitudes Towards the EU – Anti-, Pro- or No-?’, at 
http://eucenterillinois.blogspot.com/2011/11/public-attitudes-towards-eu-anti-pro-or.html 
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The great majority of Maltese Social and Human rights Groups have nurtured a positive attitude 
towards the EU because they have been supportive of it since the initial stages of the EU referendum 
campaign in 2003. In this context, one of the interviewees said that ‘many NGOs are still adapting to 
the EU’s reality’. Although an early converter to Malta’s accession, NGOs still suffered from an initial 
shock. Another interviewee maintains that ‘groups are now going through a phase of strengthening 
their capacity, changing mentality and experimenting with a greater number of opportunities and 
institutions’ (MSHG16).  
On the other hand, their Irish counterparts stress the lack of information and proper education on EU 
matters that led to apathy and negativity among various sectors of the population. 
The Irish government used to tell its people that Europe is good for money. It has never told 
us that being part of the EU is about a sense of citizenship (ISHG9). 
In the environmental arena, Maltese and Irish groups express a high degree of confidence in being 
part of the EU because it is ‘deemed as a leader of environmental legislation’ (MEG18+IEG15). The 
following excerpts reveal a pro-EU sentiment among islanders. 
Green NGOs in Malta cannot be indifferent to the EU. It is only through this way that the 
Maltese authorities are being forced to adopt more environment friendly measures (MEG18). 
The degree of Europeanisation on Irish civil society has been strong, mainly for two reasons, 
namely EU funding and EU environmental law (IEG19). 
Following this initial analysis, a series of statistical findings that try to decode attitudes towards the 
EU from different standpoints follows. Such quantitative results are corroborating evidence that 
confirms the general orientation established qualitatively as discussed above. 
Vision, training, ownership and European participation 
Interest groups were asked whether the European dimension has filtered within their organisational 
vision/mission statement. Table 2 indicates that almost 54% of Maltese Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups (SHEGs) are significantly more proactive in incorporating a European 
dimension in their vision/mission statements when compared to 38% of their Irish counterparts.  
Among other contending elements, the time factor has to be considered in this case. Forty years of 
membership might have rendered the Irish less enthusiastic about the European integration project 
and, consequently more disinclined to own a European vision.  
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Table 2: European dimension included in the vision/mission statement 
The vision/mission statement incorporates a 
European dimension 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 62 32 94 
Percentage 53.9% 38.1% 47.2% 
No Count 53 52 105 
Percentage 46.1% 61.9% 52.8% 
Total Count 115 84 199 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 4.87, v = 1, p = 0.027  
The lack of training and knowledge claimed by Irish interviewees is confirmed in Table 3 which 
reveals a notable difference between Maltese and Irish SHEGs in terms of training opportunities. 
46.1% of Maltese groups, as against 22.9% of Irish groups, have participated in training programmes 
to deepen and widen their knowledge on EU matters. 
Table 3: Training in EU affairs 
Participation in  training programmes to acquire 
necessary skills in EU affairs 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 53 19 72 
Percentage 46.1% 22.9% 36.4% 
No Count 62 64 126 
Percentage 53.9% 77.1% 63.6% 
Total Count 115 83 198 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 11.208, v = 1, p = 0.001  
The way EU matters are owned and managed at interest groups’ level is another indicator of groups’ 
attitude towards the EU. To this effect, respondents were asked whether their organisation appoints 
a person/s to take care of EU related issues. Table 4 shows that there is no significant difference 
between the two states. Approximately half of the groups do not appoint any member/s to deal with 
EU affairs (46.1% in Malta and 54.2% in Ireland). The most widely used practice in Malta (27%) is that 
of appointing one person who, besides other matters, is also responsible for the coordination of EU 
affairs. In Ireland’s case, the most preferred method is to delegate European matters to more than 
one committee officer (26.5%).  
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Table 4: Responsibility of EU affairs within organisations  
 Responsibility of EU affairs within organisations 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes, one person who is 
solely responsible 
Count 7 5 12 
Percentage 6.1% 6.0% 6.1% 
Yes, one who performs 
other tasks as well 
Count 31 11 42 
Percentage 27.0% 13.3% 21.2% 
More than one person 
responsible 
Count 24 22 46 
Percentage 20.9% 26.5% 23.2% 
No Count 53 45 98 
Percentage 46.1% 54.2% 49.5% 
Total Count 115 83 198 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 5.571, v = 3, p = 0.134  
Statistics resulting from Table 5 gauge the trend of domestic groups’ participation in EU related 
activities over a span of almost ten years (2004-2012) wherein yet again Maltese and Irish results are 
comparable. Though the difference between the two member states is not statistically significant, it 
is still worth noting these types of results as they are themselves a testimony of the high 
comparability levels between Malta and Ireland. The largest segment of groups (36.8% in Malta and 
37.4% in Ireland) registered an accelerated trend of participation, while an approximate 28.6% have 
reached a plateau (27.2% and 30% respectively). Although those registering a decreasing rate 
account for less than 10% (3.5% in Malta and 8.8% in Ireland), concern arises for those who fall under 
the category of not applicable (32.5% in Malta and 23.8% in Ireland) because they seem to be totally 
indifferent to the European reality. 
Table 5: Rate of participation in EU related activities 
The rate of participation in EU related activities 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Increased Count 42 30 72 
Percentage 36.8% 37.5% 37.1% 
Remained Stable Count 31 24 55 
Percentage 27.2% 30.0% 28.4% 
Decreased Count 4 7 11 
Percentage 3.5% 8.8% 5.7% 
Not Applicable Count 37 19 56 
Percentage 32.5% 23.8% 28.9% 
Total Count 114 80 194 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 3.648, v = 3, p = 0.302 
   
  
 16 
Links and Lobbying in the EU 
Qualitative findings in this section reinforce the belief that the Brussels route of influence does not 
replace the domestic route. European institutions rigorously demand that interest groups must first 
address their concerns to institutions at member state level. Once all domestic efforts have been 
exhausted, and a decision is taken to present the case to the European Commission, then interest 
groups must roll out an evidence-based case. Ideological or emotional appeals simply do not work at 
European level. If ‘you have done your research well’ (MSHG10) and ‘with a bit of luck’ (IEG17), the 
Commission can eventually opt to bring your case forward. 
Maltese SHEGs are well aware of how things should proceed to lobby at EU level if the need arises. 
Their comments show that they have learned fast the rules of the game. 
Prior to venturing your concerns in Europe, an organisation must first exhaust all the 
[domestic] possibilities. Yet, there have been cases where we had to go to the 
Commission. Then there are issues involving the European Parliament where we were 
also active (MSHG11). 
When we become aware that local authorities are not interested in getting things done, 
we start making pressure in Brussels. In addition, we always participate in meetings 
whenever the Environment Commissioner visits Malta (MEG18). 
Although the Maltese and Irish governments have instituted domestic structures responsible for 
civil dialogue, coordination of national policy and discussion of EU legislative measures, NGOs 
are nonetheless unrestrained to cross the sea on their way to lobby for their interest in Brussels. 
The discussion will now incorporate statistical findings that shed light on the potentials and 
limitations of Maltese and Irish interest groups to maintain hierarchical links with Brussels. 
EU contacts and lobbying  
When asked about the nature of contact they have already established in Brussels (see Table 6), 
findings show a varied selection of contact types, yet statistically they are highly comparable. A 
substantial portion of interest groups utilise multiple channels of communication. Relying on 
umbrella Euro-groups proves to be the most widely used form of attachment both in Malta (21.2%) 
and Ireland (31.2%), followed by online networking in Malta (19.2%) and, in Ireland, by members 
travelling overseas (17.6%). The ones who scored other means (11.5% in Malta and 12.8% in Ireland) 
are referring to three major types of contacts: (a) delegating this task to their parent organisation 
that in turn has contacts in Brussels, (b) contacts with MEPs and (c) meetings with European 
Commissioners when they visit the island. However there is still a substantial number of SHEGs 
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(32.7% in Malta and 23.2% in Ireland) that have not yet established any contact of any sort in 
Brussels. 
Table 6: Types of contact established in Brussels 
 The type of contact that has already been established in      
Brussels, if any 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Permanent Office in Brussels Count 3 2 5 
Percentage 1.9% 1.6% 1.8% 
Relying on umbrella Euro-
groups based in Brussels 
Count 33 39 72 
Percentage 21.2% 31.2% 25.6% 
Sending members  to Brussels 
periodically 
Count 21 22 43 
Percentage 13.5% 17.6% 15.3% 
Online networking Count 30 17 47 
Percentage 19.2% 13.6% 16.7% 
Other means Count 18 16 34 
Percentage 11.5% 12.8% 12.1% 
No contact Count 51 29 80 
Percentage 32.7% 23.2% 28.5% 
Total Count 156 125 281 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 7.154, v = 5, p = 0.209  
The next finding in Table 7 shows whether interest groups are being engaged to promote and defend 
their interests at EU level. The majority of Maltese and Irish SHEGs are still not involved (64.3% and 
57.8% respectively), indicating no significant difference between the two polities. Once more, the 
findings clearly show that in many aspects concerning the character and role of domestic interest 
groups in an EU environment, Malta and Ireland are highly comparable. 
Table 7: Lobbying at EU level 
 Engagement in lobbying with any institution of the EU   
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 41 35 76 
Percentage 35.7% 42.2% 38.4% 
No Count 74 48 122 
Percentage 64.3% 57.8% 61.6% 
Total Count 115 83 198 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.866, v = 1, p = 0.352 
The reasons behind the lack of participation at EU level are inquired in Table 8. Although Chi2 
analysis in Table 8 confirms that there is no significant difference between Malta and Ireland, the 
results are nonetheless interesting. While lack of administrative capacity is the most prominent 
reason that is debarring Maltese and Irish SHEGs from experimenting with the Brussels route of 
influence (36.3% and 27.0% respectively), the second most scored reason is that the domestic route 
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of influence is still being preferred (19.5% and 24.0% respectively). The implied cost of lobbying at 
EU level is also deemed to be a significant justification for staying out of the game (10.6% in Malta 
and 17.0% in Ireland). MSHG10 shows no hesitation in declaring that ‘the biggest hurdles in 
participating more extensively in the European experience are essentially a lack of people and 
money’.  
Table 8: Reasons for not lobbying at EU level 
Reasons why certain organisations do not engage  
with  EU institutions for lobbying purposes 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Domestic route of influence     
preferred 
Count 22 24 46 
Percentage 19.5% 24.0% 21.6% 
Targeting national ministers 
who in turn voice their 
opinion at the Council of 
Ministers 
Count 13 10 23 
Percentage 11.5% 10.0% 10.8% 
High cost of lobbying at        
EU level 
Count 12 17 29 
Percentage 10.6% 17.0% 13.6% 
No knowledge of EU 
institutional design 
Count 9 8 17 
Percentage 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 
EU does not have      
relevance 
Count 11 9 20 
Percentage 9.7% 9.0% 9.4% 
Lack of administrative   
capacity 
Count 41 27 68 
Percentage 36.3% 27.0% 31.9% 
Other reasons Count 5 5 10 
Percentage 4.4% 5.0% 4.7% 
Total Count 113 100 213 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 3.702, v = 6, p = 0.717   
The last statistical finding in this section (Table 9) shows that there is a significant difference among 
the preferences of Maltese and Irish SHEGs as to whom they lobby at the supranational level. As 
expected the European Commission and members of the European Parliament enjoy the top ranks 
in both countries (approximately 30%). This is understandable in the context of small states where 
people feel more attached to their politicians, including those functioning at the supranational level. 
Access to the European Economic and Social Committee is imbalanced; almost 16% of Irish SHEGs do 
relate to this consultative institution compared to barely 5% of their Maltese counterparts. The last 
point of significant difference concerns the reliance on other means which in the case of Malta is 
substantial (20.3%), contrasted to barely 5% on the Irish part. In the majority of cases, respondents 
were either referring to their national parent organisation or to European federations that, in turn, 
voice their concerns at the EU level. 
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Table 9: Lobbying institutions in Brussels  
 European institutions targeted for lobbying purposes 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 European Commission Count 19 24 43 
Percentage 32.2% 29.3% 30.5% 
National members of 
European Economic and 
Social Committee 
Count 3 13 16 
Percentage 5.1% 15.9% 11.3% 
National MEPs Count 21 25 46 
Percentage 35.6% 30.5% 32.6% 
Commissioner of home  
country 
Count 4 7 11 
 Percentage 6.8% 8.5% 7.8% 
Member State holding  
Presidency of Council 
Count 0 9 9 
Percentage .0% 11.0% 6.4% 
Other means Count 12 4 16 
Percentage 20.3% 4.9% 11.3% 
Total Count 59 82 141 
 Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 17.717, v = 5, p = 0.003   
EU funding and socialisation
The acquisition of EU funding is always a crucial element not only to governments but also to civil 
society groups that have been found to suffer chronically from poor resources and administrative 
capacity.24 On the other hand, accession to the EU led to a proliferation of networking opportunities 
with other European partners, thus, taking advantage of greater socialisation, collective learning and 
sharing of best practices. Qualitative findings show which of the two is most prized and how 
priorities shifted over time. Afterwards, the discussion will incorporate statistical data to determine 
the take up of funding and networking opportunities over the period between 2004 and 2012. 
Maltese SHEGs seem not to differentiate between the two stimuli as they are both deemed 
‘necessary prerequisites to live the European vocation’. According to one of the interviewees, a 
Maltese political observer, the two major problems that groups face in Malta are ‘smallness’, leading 
to a limited resource base; and ‘islandness’ that can lock in stakeholders in geographical and mental 
isolation. To address these innate coercive restraints, the Maltese government felt that it is its 
obligation to set up a specialised mediating body, the Malta-EU Steering and Action Committee 
(MEUSAC), to help interest groups apply for funds and identify European partners. Thus, funding and 
socialisation are not mutually exclusive but two indispensable elements. 
Feedback by other Maltese interviewees is very similar and no difference results between the two 
cohorts of selected interest groups. 
                                                          
24
 R. Pace (rap.) (2008), Europe Listens 2 – A Consultation with Maltese Civil Society, 9-12 December 2008, 
Malta: Representation of the European Commission in Malta and MEUSAC. 
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If it weren’t for the EU funds, our group couldn’t have been able to flourish and increase its 
European and international connections. The sustainability of our organisation is based on 
government and EU funding (MSHG13). 
The EU gave us new opportunities to embark on good practice sharing with other groups in 
the EU. We started creating partnerships and exchange ideas beyond our shores. However, 
we cannot seize opportunities unless we have the funds. (MEG19). 
The Irish narrative presents a completely different line-up. Having nurtured a framework that is 
heavily reliant on the Anglo-Saxon world, Irish SHEGs never really developed a need to Europeanise 
their circles of networks and contacts. So the element of socialisation was non-existent for many Irish 
groups but, in these last years, things started moving in a different direction.  
We have only introduced the international dimension in these last two years. We are 
guilty as everybody else. It has to do a bit with our national character. It has a little 
bit to do with how the government has always treated the EU (ISHG9). 
For a country that was focused on Britain and America only, it shifted to become 
focused on Europe as well. But this is a very recent development (ISHG13). 
Irish green groups share the same narrative. Since Ireland’s accession in 1973, funding always 
enjoyed a central and almost monolithic supremacy over all other considerations.   
Quite definitely, for a long time funding was first priority. No socialisation at all (IEG15). 
The process of Europeanisation has been motivated by the opportunity of obtaining funds 
for many years (IEG21). 
The next step is to present a number of quantitative findings that deal either with EU funding or with 
the socialisation effect. 
EU funds, federations and partners  
The selected series of statistical findings led to no significant differences between Malta and Ireland 
(that is, p value is above the 0.05 criterion), thus confirming a high degree of comparability. 
Table 10 shows that Maltese interest groups are slightly more adventurous than the Irish in trying 
their best to access EU funding (60% and 51.8% respectively). Likewise, the rate of success is also 
comparable. Table 11 reveals that Maltese and Irish SHEGs have almost the same success rate 
(approximately 77%), with the two cohorts of financing between 1 and 5 projects being the most 
   
  
 21 
subscribed to (60% [22.9% + 37.1%] in Malta and 66% [20.5% + 45.5%] in Ireland). The percentage of 
unsuccessful applicants is also highly comparable, that is, 22.9% in Malta and 20.5% in Ireland.  
Table 10: Attempts to access EU funds 
 Attempts to access EU funds 
Social, Human rights 
and Environmental 
Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 69 43 112 
Percentage 60.0% 51.8% 56.6% 
No Count 46 40 86 
Percentage 40.0% 48.2% 43.4% 
Total Count 115 83 198 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 1.317, v = 1, p = 0.251 
 
Table 11: Success in obtaining EU funds 
 Success achieved in obtaining EU funds 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes in 1 project Count 16 9 25 
Percentage 22.9% 20.5% 21.9% 
Yes in more than 1 less than 5 
projects 
Count 26 20 46 
Percentage 37.1% 45.5% 40.4% 
Yes in 5 projects or more Count 12 6 18 
Percentage 17.1% 13.6% 15.8% 
No Count 16 9 25 
 Percentage 22.9% 20.5% 21.9% 
Total Count 70 44 114 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.815, v = 3, p = 0.846 
The next set of data figures deal exclusively with the socialisation effect, in particular the 
participation of domestic groups in European federations and their drive to establish partners to 
work on joint projects and engage in mutual learning processes. A European federation is an 
umbrella organisation made up of member associations that are functional on a member state level. 
Such federations provide a forum for European cooperation in a wide range of fields, including 
training, research and lobbying. Table 12 shows that almost half of SHEGs in Malta and Ireland are 
affiliated to European federations (43.0% and 47.0% respectively). However the number of non-
affiliated organisations, most of which are only functional at local or parish level, is still significant. 
When the latter were asked why they do not feel the need to appertain to European federations, the 
most scored reason in the two countries is that ‘such need does not exist’ because they are entirely 
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committed to domestic issues. Secondly, a third of SHEGs in Malta and Ireland declare that the cost 
of affiliation is too expensive. 
Table 12: Affiliation to European federations 
 Affiliation to any European federation 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 49 39 88 
Percentage 43.0% 47.0% 44.7% 
No Count 65 44 109 
  Percentage 57.0% 53.0% 55.3% 
Total Count 114 83 197 
 Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.312, v = 1, p = 0.577 
Table 13 reveals another element of high comparability between the two states in the identification 
of European partner organisations to cooperate over joint projects. Half of SHEGs in Malta and 
Ireland have established partner organisations across the EU (49.6% and 54.8% respectively).  
Table 13: Cooperation with European partners 
 Identification of European partner organisations to  
cooperate over joint projects 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 58 46 103 
Percentage 50.4% 54.8% 51.8% 
No Count 57 38 96 
Percentage 49.6% 45.2% 48.2% 
Total Count 115 84 199 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.525, v = 1, p = 0.469  
EU norms and values 
Changes in norms are a critical factor to determine whether European influences have infiltrated the 
mindset of interest groups’ members. Maltese interviewees are very optimistic that more changes in 
attitude, culture and perception are on the way as a result of our EU membership because they 
believe that the ball has already started rolling at a faster pace than expected.  
Those who are involved in minority rights are very much involved in European affairs. For 
us, the EU is a source to speed up change in [domestic] legislation through a fast track 
change in public mentality (MSHG10). 
Our NGOs must be on the forefront to bring pilot studies to Malta and, when enough 
experience has been gained, they could be extended to other larger member states. I am 
thinking of mentoring, partnerships, and internal reengineering projects (MSHG15). 
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Other Maltese protagonists emphasise that the need for change is already being realised, not only at 
structural and tactical levels, but most importantly, in terms of leadership transformation. 
We’ve embarked on internal strategic changes to develop and diversify as an entity since 
Malta’s EU accession. This involved a change in vision through a different leadership 
mentality (MSHG13). 
We have brought a number of European group leaders to address our members who 
challenged our frame of mind and taught us how to look beyond ourselves. It is all about 
being open to new ideas (MSHG14). 
At times optimism makes way for a more sarcastic tone. When interviewing Irish leaders, Piaras Mac 
Éinrí, a respected Irish academic, diplomat and civil society activist, is unequivocal: ‘I would be critical 
of the failure of the Irish NGO sector to fully understand the possibilities of a more proactive approach 
to EU but, then again, most of these NGOs just don’t have the knowledge, experience or resources to 
do this’.25  
Normative change stimuli 
Table 14 measures the extent of EU influence on the organisations’ members’ mindset. The mean 
rating scores in both countries are almost congruent (2.65 in Malta and 2.69 in Ireland), signifying 
that respondents are closer to considerable limits of influence on a four point likert scale. Since the p 
value exceeds the 0.05 criterion, no statistical difference emerges between Malta and Ireland. 
Table 14: The extent of EU influence on the mindset of members within the organisation 
Social, Human rights 
and Environmental 
Groups Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Mann-
Whitney 
U test p value Lower Bound Upper Bound 
 Malta 2.65 1.047 2.45 2.84 4485.500 0.840 
 Ireland 2.69 1.001 2.46 2.91   
 
Similarly, Table 15 reveals the extent of influence by European federations’ norms and practices on 
the character of domestic interest groups. The mean rating score is the same for both countries 
(2.165 mean), implying a minor extent of influence on a four point likert scale. Since findings are 
highly comparable, no significant difference is affirmed. 
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 P.M. Éinrí (2012), Correspondence with the author. 
 
   
  
 24 
Table 15: The extent of influence on the organisation by norms and practices of European federations 
Social, Human 
rights and 
Environmental 
Groups Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean Mann-
Whitney 
U test p value Lower Bound Upper Bound 
 Malta 2.16 1.172 1.94 2.38 4469.000 0.804 
 Ireland 2.17 0.991 1.95 2.40   
 
Table 16 conveys a significant difference in the receptivity of Maltese and Irish SHEGs towards new 
ideas stemming from their European partners. While 42.5% of the Maltese believe that there have 
been changes within their organisations that are attributed to their European partners, 47.8% deny 
any causal relationship between internal changes and external influences. Contrastingly, the Irish 
show a greater sense of inconclusiveness: 39.8% confirm the causal relationship, 31.3% deny it and a 
substantial segment, 28.9%, did not give a definite answer and preferred the ‘don’t know’ category. 
Table 16: Internal changes attributed to new ideas brought about by European partners 
There have been changes within the organisation that 
are attributed to new ideas brought about by 
European partners 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 48 33 81 
Percentage 42.5% 39.8% 41.3% 
No Count 54 26 80 
Percentage 47.8% 31.3% 40.8% 
Don't Know Count 11 24 35 
Percentage 9.7% 28.9% 17.9% 
Total Count 113 83 196 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 13.122, v = 2, p = 0.001  
While the three previous results showed the extent of European influence through vertical and 
lateral axis, the next one maps out the proper stimuli that trigger changes within domestic interest 
groups. Table 17 shows the ranking of five major stimuli emanating from the EU’s pattern and style 
of governance. In the case of Maltese SHEGS it is clear that they are primarily motivated by European 
funds (3.84 mean), followed by socialisation with European partners (3.10 mean). In the case of Irish 
SHEGs, the major stimulus of change is almost spread equally among three sources, namely 
socialisation with European partners (3.32 mean), European funds (3.31 mean) and the value of 
consensus (3.12 mean). The fact that the p value in the case of European funding is just on the point 
of 0.05 criterion of significance indicates that, in this case only, the result goes beyond the 
parameters of the sample. 
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Table 17: Sources of stimulus that instigate change in the organisation’s tactics and strategies 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Mean  Mann-
Whitney U 
Test p value 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
European  
Funds 
Malta 3.8396 1.26253 3.4916 4.1876 617.0000 0.050 
Ireland 3.3065 1.20884 2.8630 3.7499   
Consensus  
Value 
Malta 2.6132 1.17523 2.2893 2.9371 661.0000 0.131 
Ireland 3.1129 1.37058 2.6102 3.6156   
Socialisation  
With Partners 
Malta 3.1038 1.14924 2.7870 3.4205 739.0000 0.437 
Ireland 3.3226 1.30095 2.8454 3.7998   
Positive  
Attitude 
Malta 2.4528 1.02029 2.1716 2.7341 689.0000 0.210 
Ireland 2.7097 .99812 2.3436 3.0758   
Training 
opportunities 
Malta 2.9906 1.15813 2.6713 3.3098 632.5000 0.075 
 Ireland 2.5484 .89773 2.2191 2.8777   
Hypothesis testing 
The concluding part brings together all the results that emerged from both quantitative and 
qualitative data streams, addressing the two original aims and identifying areas for further research. 
The first research aim, that is, to assess whether Maltese and Irish interest groups have experienced 
a significant degree of Europeanisation or not, is to be achieved by a statistical test. The second 
research aim which tries to single out which enablers of change are most prevalent in the two 
countries, in other words whether horizontal or vertical dimensions of Europeanisation are involved, 
is to be addressed by a qualitative thematic analysis. 
Table 18 computes the earlier statistical data to present an overall picture of the changes that 
occurred in interest groups in Malta and Ireland as a consequence of a number of variables related to 
Europeanisation. For a variable to be considered as a contributor of a significant change, it must 
satisfy the criteria of exceeding the limit of 50% in its score. Likewise, if it does not exceed 50%, it is 
not deemed to have caused a significant change. In the case of answers involving a four point likert 
scale, significant change signifies that the score has exceeded the mid-point position, that is, 2.5. If 
this is not surpassed, no significant change has occurred. 
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Table 18: Deciphering which Europeanisation variables caused significant change  
    No significant change Significant change 
    Malta Ireland Malta Ireland 
1 
European dimension included in 
vision/mission statement    
2 Training in EU affairs    
3 
Responsibility of EU affairs within 
organisations    
4 
Participation in EU related 
activities    
5 Established contacts in Brussels    
6 Lobbying at the EU level    
7 Attempts to access EU funding    
8 Success in obtaining EU funding    
9 Affiliation to European federations    
10 
Cooperation with European 
partners    
11 
EU influence on the mindset of 
members within organisations    
12 
Influence of European federations 
on organisation's norms and 
practices    
13 
Internal changes attributed to 
European partners    
14 EU funds as change stimulus    
15 
Consensus value as change 
stimulus    
16 Socialisation as change stimulus    
17 
Positive attitude as change 
stimulus    
18 Training as change stimulus    
  TOTALS: 6 7 12 11 
  
The next step is to convert these ratios into statistical outcomes so as to carry out the testing of the 
null hypothesis. Since in this case we are comparing two proportions and not means, then the z-score 
is being used to test hypothesis because the sampling distribution of the difference of two 
proportions is assumed to be normally distributed. Suppose that Irish groups were assessed on 
1n  
aspects of significant change and 
2n  aspects of marginal change. Let 1X  be the number of aspects in 
which Irish groups exhibited a significant change and let 
2X  be the number of aspects in which they 
exhibited a marginal change. The sample proportions 
1p  and 2p  are: 
1
1
1
X
p
n
  and 22
2
X
p
n
  
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The central limit theorem states that the random variable z (z-score) has an approximate standard 
Normal distribution where: 
z = (
1p - 2p ) – (p1 - p2) / sqrt *  p (1- p) (1/n1 + 1/n2) ]  
and 1 2
1 2
ˆ
X X
p
n n
+
=
+
 
If we assume that Irish groups can be assessed on a very larger number of aspects, then the actual 
proportions (
1p  and 2p ), of aspects in which they exhibited significant or marginal change are 
unknown.  In order to test whether the actual proportion 
1p  (actual proportion of aspects in which 
Irish actors exhibited a significant change) differs significantly from the actual proportion 
2p  (actual 
proportion of aspects in which Irish actors exhibited a marginal change), we specify the following 
hypotheses: 
0 1 2
1 1 2
: 0
: 0
H p p
H p p
 
 
 
The null hypothesis (actual proportions do not differ significantly) is accepted if the estimated value 
of z lies between 1.96 . On the other hand, the alternative hypothesis (proportions differ 
significantly) is accepted if the estimated value of z lies beyond 1.96 .   
Now we can introduce the actual statistical figures to test hypothesis. In 12 out of a total of 18 
aspects Maltese interest groups displayed a significant change, whereas in 6 out of a total of 18 
aspects they displayed a marginal change. Thus the sample proportion of aspects in which a 
significant change (
1p ) was exhibited is 66.67% (12/18 x 100%) and the sample proportion of aspects 
in which a marginal change (
2p ) was exhibited is 33.33% (6/18 x 100%).  
So if n1 = 18, X1 = 12, n2 = 18 and X2 = 6 , then  
1p = X1 / n1 = 12/18 = 0.6667   and    2p = X2 / n2 = 6/18 = 0.3333  
 p = X1 + X2 / n1 + n2  = 12+6 / 18+18 = 0.5 
Standard error = sqrt [  p (1-  p) (1/ n1 + 1/ n2) ] = sqrt [(0.5) (0.5) (1/18 + 1/18)] = 0.1666 
z = (
1p  - 2p ) / standard error = 0.6667 – 0.3333 / 0.1666 = 2.0004 
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Since z = 2.0004 exceeds 1.96 we accept the alternative hypothesis indicating that the proportions of 
aspects in which Maltese groups exhibited a significant change is significantly larger than the 
proportion of aspects in which they exhibited a marginal change. In other words Maltese interest 
groups have experienced significant Europeanisation. 
If we apply the same method, the z-score of Irish interest groups is 1.3288. Since it does not exceed 
1.96 we accept the null hypothesis indicating that the proportions of aspects in which Irish groups 
exhibited a significant change is NOT significantly larger than the proportion of aspects in which they 
exhibited a marginal change. Thus interest groups in Ireland have experienced marginal 
Europeanisation. 
Conclusion: the degree and nature of Europeanisation 
So far we have established the degree of Europeanisation among Maltese and Irish groups. Our 
second endeavour is to establish which enablers of change are at play in the two polities. In 
particular we have to differentiate between, on the one hand, Europeanisation as a result of vertical 
stimuli based on lobbying and the maximisation of efficient results and, on the other hand, 
Europeanisation based on horizontal stimuli that emphasises socialisation and coordination. The 
answer is provided through an inductive process of data analysis. 
Maltese interest groups are more resolute to live up to their ‘European vocation’ to the full, despite 
inbuilt coercive constraints that impose limits to European exposure. Many of their leaders, 
particularly those of peak interest groups and mediating bodies, talk about ‘the need for Europe’ to 
reaffirm themselves, their organisation and for all they believe in. Experience on the ground is 
indicating that the insular culture and behavioural attitudes of interest groups are likewise being 
gradually transformed through a process of normativeness and interaction among a wider network 
of European political communities. Thus it comes as no surprise that the Maltese have adopted a 
more positive and supportive attitude towards the EU. However engagement with the EU 
institutional architecture is still low because financial and human backup are lacking back home. 
Notwithstanding restraints, Maltese interest groups are learning fast the rules of the game because 
of their enhanced socialisation at the European level and in other member states. Both vertical and 
lateral triggers of Europeanisation are transforming the character of Maltese civil society, but data 
give ample evidence that the predominant stimuli are the horizontal enablers of change, implying 
that the true cause of change is of a sociological origin. 
Contrastingly, interest groups in Ireland are ambivalent to the European reality. Although they admit 
that their attitude, knowledge and experience towards European affairs are somehow limited, they 
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are still vociferous to get from Brussels all that was denied by their government in the social and 
environmental policy domains. Accession to the EU has provided them with an increased number of 
opportunities, in particular legislative measures and funding resources, to exercise their influence in 
more pragmatic ways, always in search for optimum results to maximise the attainment of their 
respective interests. However, the recent economic crisis continued to dampen the outlook of the 
Irish towards the EU. Due to their innate attachment to the Anglo-Saxon culture, Irish groups have 
not invested enough effort to identify and collaborate with peer organisations from across other 
member states. When taking stock of all the factors at play, it transpires that the type of 
Europeanisation characterising Irish interest groups finds its roots in its vertical dimension which 
refers to hierarchical linkages and negotiations between European and national levels of governance. 
In conclusion, this study confirms that interest groups in Malta and Ireland are undergoing a process 
of gradual Europeanisation that may eventually lead to a reconfiguration of domestic powers. This 
assertion by no means implies that European influences have wiped out the ingrained geopolitical 
characteristics embedded in the two polities. In fact, it is by understanding these embedded features 
that one can determine the extent and true nature of Europeanisation at the domestic level over 
time. 
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